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Abstract
California water law has traditionally treated groundwater and surface water as separate resources.
The 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) broke with this tradition by requiring
groundwater managers to avoid signiﬁcant and unreasonable adverse impacts to beneﬁcial uses of
surface water. This paper considers the trajectory of this partial integration of science, law, and
resource management policy. Drawing on legal analysis and participatory workshops with subject area
experts, we describe the challenges of reconciling the separate legal systems that grew out of an
artiﬁcial legal distinction between different aspects of the same resource. Our analysis offers two main
contributions. First, it demonstrates that laws that subdivide an interconnected resource can have
legacy effects that linger long after lawmakers begin dismantling the artiﬁcial divides. Using SGMA as a
case study, the article illustrates the complexities of reconciling law with science, showing that
reconciliation is a process that does not end with updating statutes, or with any other single
intervention. Second, we introduce a framework for evaluating the elements of an effort to reconcile
law with scientiﬁc understanding, whether that reform effort involves groundwater or some other
resource. Applying that framework helps reveal where lingering legacy effects still need to be
addressed. More generally, it reveals the need for literature addressing science-policy interactions to
devote more attention to the multifaceted nature of law and policy reform. Much of that literature
describes policy-making in broad and undifferentiated terms, often referring simply to ‘the sciencepolicy interface.’ But as the SGMA case study illustrates, the complex and multi-layered nature of
policy-making means that a successful reform effort may need to address many science-policy
interfaces.

1. Introduction
For decades, observers have noted the close yet
troubled relationships between environmental science
and law [1]. Science and law are often intimately linked
and shape one another: many environmental laws call
for decisions grounded in ‘the best available science,’
and, in turn, legal requirements often shape scientiﬁc
research priorities [2, 3]. But the relationships are
rarely frictionless. Laws may not reﬂect scientiﬁc
understanding at the time they are made. And as
scientiﬁc understanding evolves, laws that originally
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd

reﬂected contemporary science can become outdated.
The resulting artiﬁcial or outdated legal distinctions
can make effective natural resource management
difﬁcult.
Partly in response to these problems, many studies
of environmental law, science, and policy have sought
to understand how science can better inform environmental policy and management [4, 5]. Within this
broad arena, legal scholarship has focused on catching
law up to science—that is, on ensuring that legal decision-makers understand, and that laws are grounded
in, the latest and best scientiﬁc research [6, 7]. Scholars
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have also focused on making sensible decisions in contexts where important scientiﬁc uncertainties remain
[8, 9]. Similarly, science and social science literature
often addresses the challenges of aligning scientiﬁc
research priorities with decision-makers’ needs,
and of establishing and maintaining communication
between researchers and policy actors [4, 5, 10].
These literatures leave a different question underexplored: what happens when policy-makers begin to
correct artiﬁcial legal distinctions, but institutions and
practices that were built around those distinctions
remain? Put another way, how do legal systems and
management institutions respond to the legacy effects
of years of getting science wrong?
This article addresses these questions, using California groundwater management as a case study. The
state’s laws have long drawn an artiﬁcial distinction
between surface water and groundwater, creating the
legal ﬁction that the two resources are distinct [11–13].
This divergence occurred even though both scientists
and lawyers have long realized it does not reﬂect
hydrologic reality [11, 14]. By explicitly recognizing
connections between groundwater and surface water,
California’s 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) [15] partially dismantled this
boundary [16]. Speciﬁcally, SGMA requires groundwater managers to avoid ‘[d]epletions of interconnected surface water that have signiﬁcant and
unreasonable adverse impacts on beneﬁcial uses of the
surface water’ [17].
This legislative recognition of scientiﬁc reality is
only part of the course-correction process, however.
In practice, the fragmentation and separate evolution
of natural resource management systems can present a
variety of continuing challenges to more integrated
management. California exempliﬁes these challenges:
the separation of groundwater and surface water law
generated different, and sometimes conﬂicting, rules,
which were implemented by different government
entities through different processes, with no traditional venue or process for resolving conﬂicts.
In the environmental ﬁeld, this kind of scientiﬁcally-ungrounded legal distinction is common
[3, 18, 19]. For example, jurisdictional boundaries frequently cut through watersheds [20]. Distinctions
between subject areas, such as water law, land-use law,
and environmental law, artiﬁcially segment environmental governance [3]. Some divisions are the unavoidable product of needing to subdivide the world
into manageable units, but others reﬂect outdated scientiﬁc beliefs, misunderstandings, or deliberate oversimpliﬁcations [7]. Anywhere lawmakers attempt to
address these distinctions, the basic challenges California now faces are likely to recur.
We argue that modernizing and integrating these
fragmented legal regimes requires more than just
updating the statutory framework to align with biophysical reality. Instead, it requires taking a comprehensive view of law and policy—a view that
2

encompasses underlying principles, related statutes,
regulations, agency practices, and institutional context
as well as core statutory requirements—and using that
comprehensive view to identify steps needed to reconcile science and law. We develop a framework for such
an evaluation, demonstrate its utility by applying it to
SGMA, and address its broader generalizability.

2. Methods
This article draws on legal research and participatory
workshops. The legal research, which took place both
before and after the workshops, drew on standard legal
research methodology. Speciﬁcally, we reviewed the
SGMA statute itself, its implementing regulations,
other relevant state and federal statutes, relevant state
and federal court decisions, and secondary sources
that describe and critique these sources of law. We
used this analysis to identify areas where governing law
is relatively settled and areas where uncertainty or
disagreement remain. We complemented that analysis
with a literature review focused on technical and
scientiﬁc issues associated with surface and groundwater management.
We used participatory workshops, based on the
principle that actionable knowledge comes from interaction between researchers and their audiences
[21, 22], to facilitate co-production of results [23]. We
convened eighteen experts (table 1), including
groundwater scientists, technical consultants, local
government ofﬁcials, legal experts, and state agency
ofﬁcials, for two day-long, facilitated, discussionbased workshops [24, 25]. We selected participants
through a purposive sampling method [26] based on
our knowledge of the ﬁeld, as well as through consultation with experts in California groundwater management. In particular, we designed the workshop to
include thought leaders from a range of organizational
and disciplinary perspectives.
The ﬁrst workshop was framed by preliminary
presentations, which were delivered by the organizers,
on technical and legal issues associated with SGMA
and groundwater-surface water interactions. Through
facilitated discussions, the group then identiﬁed and
prioritized key unanswered questions about legal,
institutional, and technical aspects of groundwatersurface water interactions under SGMA. We synthesized the group’s identiﬁcation of key issues and questions into a detailed outline, which we shared with
participants prior to the second workshop.
For the second workshop, we used the group’s
prioritization of issues to select case studies of emerging management approaches. Workshop participants
presented those case studies to the group. We also
offered hypothetical solutions for legal and technical
challenges. We used the case studies and the hypothetical solutions to frame discussions of solutions to the
questions we had identiﬁed during the ﬁrst workshop.
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Table 1. Institutional afﬁliations of workshop participants.
Institutional afﬁliation
State agency
University
Non-governmental organization

Number of participants

California Department of Water Resources
California State Water Resources Control Board
University of Californiaa
Community Water Center
Environmental Defense Fund
The Nature Conservancy

Law ﬁrm
Local agency
Water resources consulting ﬁrm
Foundation

4
4

3
2b
2
2
1

a

Including three groundwater scientists and one environmental law scholar.
Three other participants were also attorneys, but not with traditional law ﬁrms. In this table they are counted based on their type of
employer.

b

Our goal was to understand where the group generally
agreed upon solutions to SGMA-related challenges,
what those solutions might be, and where the group
perceived there to be major outstanding issues without
ready solutions.
In addition to this article, our research generated
a white paper containing guidance for practitioners [27].

3. Turning scientiﬁc knowledge into law: a
conceptual framework
While statutory modiﬁcation is a logical initial focus
for efforts to reconcile law with science, it will often be
insufﬁcient for effective change. Legal systems’ integration of new scientiﬁc knowledge will necessarily
occur on multiple levels, and a clearer understanding
of this reality will help those working to reconcile law
with science.
The need for multifaceted reform arises partly
from the complexity of policymaking and law. Legal
scholars often emphasize that law is more than just the
words in authoritative legal texts like constitutions,
statutes, and court decisions. Rather, laws take effect
through the interpretations and actions of a variety of
institutions, governmental and otherwise, and those
interpretations and actions often expand upon, and
sometimes differ from, the letter of written law
[28, 29]. Relatedly, administrative lawyers emphasize
that statutes are often just a starting point for the
development of legal rules, and that statutory mandates often need to be ﬂeshed out through regulations,
guidance documents, agency orders, and an accumulation of other discretionary decisions [30]. Reform
also is likely to be incremental, even when scientists
and policymakers alike realize that the old regime was
premised on assumptions that were irreconcilable
with science, because law is sticky [16]. People build
businesses and governance institutions in reliance on
existing legal regimes, so vested interests often support
the status quo [31].
3

With limited exceptions (e.g. [32]), existing literature on the interactions between science, policy, and
law, though extensive, does not address the multilayered legal, institutional, and political reality of natural resource policy implementation. Instead, it often
focuses on communication systems and structures
that will help deliver scientiﬁc information to policymakers and that will help scientists understand policymakers’ needs [4, 5, 10]. Other work addresses the
appropriate degree of engagement between scientists
and political decision makers, with some writers
arguing for greater engagement and others worrying
that such engagement will undercut the integrity of
scientiﬁc research [33]. Within this realm of ‘sciencepolicy interface’ or ‘knowledge-to-action’ research,
the category of policymaking or decision-making—
that is, the things decision-makers do in response to
scientiﬁc information—is often described in a broad
and undifferentiated way, and scholars rarely engage
systematically with the variety of mechanisms and
institutions through which law and policy take effect.
Similarly, the voluminous literature on adaptive management, though it addresses continuous mutual feedback between science and policy, tends to focus
on decision-making within pre-set legal structures
rather than on the elements of systematic legal
reform [34, 35].
Rather than treating the policy/action realm as a
single, undifferentiated category, theoretical and
empirical descriptions of policymaking should better
reﬂect the complex array of processes and decisionmakers. Describing ‘the science-policy interface’ is a
somewhat misleading oversimpliﬁcation, for even a
focused effort to integrate scientiﬁc knowledge into
policy and law will involve multiple interfaces, each
involving different recipients of and pathways for scientiﬁc knowledge. Science-policy interfaces is a more
accurate descriptor. There are many potential target
points for law and policy reform, and a successful
effort to reconcile law with scientiﬁc knowledge (or to
reform law for motivations unrelated to science) probably cannot target just one or two. Figure 1, below,
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Figure 1. Potential interfaces between scientiﬁc knowledge and legal and policy reform. This diagram obviously is simpliﬁed, and
additional feedback loops and more complex relationships, which could be described in more detailed empirical studies beyond the
scope of this work, will exist within and between the boxes described here. Additionally, because governance institutions are often
created and their practices are often partially controlled through written law, there will be overlap between our two general categories
of interfaces.

captures the range of options. It illustrates that a legal/
policy regime is made up of many different components, ranging from broad governance principles to
the discretionary actions of individual resource
managers.
This conceptual framework has two important
implications. First, it provides an architecture for
efforts to address long-entrenched laws that are inconsistent with scientiﬁc knowledge. Second, it provides a
rough checklist for evaluating efforts that already are
underway.

4. SGMA and California’s partial
integration of groundwater and surface
water law
To illustrate the utility of this conceptual framework,
we focus on the evolving law of groundwater and
surface water in California. To provide background
and a point of comparison, we begin by discussing the
pre-SGMA legal regime. We then explain where
SGMA closes gaps and where continuing challenges
remain.
4.1. The pre-SGMA legal regime
Throughout the United States, groundwater law has
long lagged behind surface water law [36]. California is
no exception, and while the pre-SGMA legal systems
that allocated California’s surface water and groundwater include areas of consistency, they also created
major, and deeply entrenched, gaps and conﬂicts.
Many of the gaps and conﬂicts have roots in California’s traditional systems of water rights. Both
4

surface water and groundwater rights systems include
usage rights based on ownership of land adjacent to
the resource (riparian or overlying rights) and usage
rights based on prior appropriation of water (table 2).
California’s courts, agencies, and water managers have
struggled to reconcile rights grounded in these different fundamental principles [37]. Even when rights
share a basic operating principle—whether that principle is shared use or temporal priority—data gaps and
a lack of active management inhibit effective integration of legal regimes [38].
Beyond water rights law, other state and federal
statutes affect water management in California, and
these laws also tended to treat the two resources separately. With relatively rare exceptions [39], federal statutes like the Clean Water Act and the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) apply primarily to surface water
management, as do their state-law counterparts. Regulation of groundwater extraction has not traditionally been a focus of federal or California statutory law.
The divides that traditionally separated groundwater and surface water management are institutional
and procedural as well as doctrinal. For years, water
rights regimes for groundwater and surface water have
been implemented through separate institutions
(table 2). The State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) is California’s primary surface water regulator, and oversees both water rights and water quality protection. But until SGMA’s passage, no state
agency regulated groundwater use, except where
groundwater was pumped from so-called ‘known and
deﬁnite channels’ [11, 16].
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Table 2. Summary comparison of water rights, governance institutions, and degree of state and federal oversight over decision making for
surface water and groundwater in California (pre-SGMA).
Element

Surface water

Groundwater

Rights based on ownership of
adjacent land (correlative)

Riparian rights: Waterfront landowners
are entitled to use a reasonable share
of the natural ﬂow from the adjacent
waterway on that land. Shortages are
shared equitably among riparian
users.

Overlying rights: Owners of land overlying
a groundwater basin are entitled to
pump a reasonable share of the renewable groundwater for use on that land.
Shortages are shared equitably among
overlying users.

Rights based on the prior
appropriation of water
(ﬁrst in time=ﬁrst in
right)

Appropriative rights: Surface water that
is surplus to the needs of riparian
users may be diverted and put to reasonable non-riparian uses. When
there is not enough water in a waterway to satisfy all appropriative users’
needs, more senior appropriators
(those with older rights) may take the
full amount of their water right
before more junior appropriators
may take any water. Since late 1914,
all new appropriative rights have
required approval by the SWRCB.

Appropriative rights: Groundwater that is
surplus to the needs of overlying users
may be pumped and put to reasonable
use on others’ lands within the basin or
for export outside the basin. When
there is not enough groundwater available to satisfy all appropriative users’
needs, more senior appropriators may
take the full amount of their water right
before more junior appropriators may
take any water. No state approval is
required for appropriative use of
groundwater.

Management institutions

Surface water has been managed by a
range of actors including local water
agencies, the California Department
of Water Resources (manager of the
State Water Project), the US Bureau
of Reclamation (manager of the Central Valley Project), and private
entities.

Groundwater has been managed primarily by local water agencies and private entities.

Regulatory
institutions

Regulation of water rights

The SWRCB directly regulates ‘post1914’ appropriative surface water
rights and plays an oversight and
enforcement role for all surface water
rights.

Groundwater use regulation has largely
been left to local governments. Counties generally require permits for well
construction or modiﬁcation and have
sometimes imposed restrictions on
groundwater extraction and use, especially out-of-area exports. A few localities have imposed pumping fees or
other general restrictions. However,
local regulatory activity has historically
been minimal in many areas of the
state.

Regulation of water quality

The SWRCB implements and enforces
state and federal surface water and
drinking water quality requirements.

The SWRCB implements and enforces
state groundwater quality and state and
federal drinking water quality requirements. The US Environmental Protection Agency and the state Department
of Toxic Substances Control also regulate cleanups of waste sites, many
involving groundwater contamination.

Other environmental
regulation

State and federal wildlife agencies
implement and enforce the state and
federal endangered species acts and
other laws that protect surface-water
dependent ecosystems, species, and
environmental values.

Traditionally, there are minimal intersections between federal and state habitat/
wildlife protection laws and groundwater management.

Degree of state oversight over decision-making

Signiﬁcant state oversight

Minimal state oversight

Degree of federal involvement in
decision-making

Moderate to signiﬁcant federal
involvement

Minimal federal involvement.

Water rights

5
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Figure 2. Undesirable results to be avoided under SGMA. Source: California Department of Water Resources.

Instead, groundwater use regulation has long been
left to local governments and the courts. Some local
governments used their authority to create sophisticated and successful groundwater management
regimes [40]. But in much of the state—particularly in
the state’s major agricultural regions, where groundwater use is heaviest—local regulatory activity has
been minimal [41]. Similarly, while courts have adjudicated rights in some groundwater basins, few major
agricultural groundwater basins have been adjudicated [42].
4.2. The impact of SGMA
New legislation is often a key mechanism for bringing
law in line with scientiﬁc understanding. That was true
with SGMA, which explicitly acknowledges groundwater-surface water interconnections and compels
groundwater managers to consider these interconnections. Speciﬁcally, the statute sets a state policy of
managing groundwater resources ‘sustainably for
long-term reliability and multiple economic, social,
and environmental beneﬁts for current and future
beneﬁcial uses’ [43]. Sustainability means avoiding
‘undesirable results,’ including ‘[d]epletions of interconnected surface water that have signiﬁcant and
unreasonable adverse impacts on beneﬁcial uses of the
surface water’ [44] (ﬁgure 2). Regulations adopted
under SGMA deﬁne ‘interconnected surface water’ as
‘surface water that is hydraulically connected at any
point by a continuous saturated zone to the underlying
aquifer and the overlying surface water is not completely depleted’ [45]. ‘Beneﬁcial uses’ include supporting
groundwater-dependent ecosystems as well as human
consumptive and non-consumptive uses of surface
water [46].
SGMA also is compelling the creation of new agencies, regulations, guidance, decision-making processes, and institutional relationships, all of which will
need to address groundwater-surface water interactions (among other matters). New local groundwater
sustainability agencies (GSAs) must develop and
implement groundwater sustainability plans (GSPs)
for groundwater basins prioritized by the California
Department of Water Resources (DWR) [47]. GSPs
must demonstrate how GSAs will manage groundwater to avoid undesirable depletions of surface water.
SGMA also requires DWR to develop groundwater
regulations, provide technical assistance, and review
6

the sufﬁciency of GSPs [48]. The SWRCB is responsible for intervening, and potentially taking over management, in a groundwater basin if the two agencies
deem a GSP or its implementation insufﬁcient [49].
Both state agencies thus have signiﬁcant new roles in
groundwater regulation; they are no longer limited to
their traditional surface water domains.
SGMA therefore takes signiﬁcant action at some of
the interfaces identiﬁed by our conceptual framework
(ﬁgure 1). But, as explained below, the process of
reconciling law with scientiﬁc understanding is just
beginning.
4.3. Continuing challenges
While SGMA takes important steps to reconcile legal
structures with hydrologic reality, many challenges
remain. Drawing upon our workshops, where discussion focused on continuing challenges, and on our
independent research and analysis, the discussion
below summarizes the steps not yet taken toward
effective integration.
We stress that our analysis is not intended as an
indictment of SGMA’s authors. Ambiguity is inevitable in any law of such sweeping scope, for legislators
cannot foresee, let alone resolve, every complication
with one bill. That is particularly true for a statute, like
SGMA, that attempted to address many issues;
improving management of groundwater-surface
water interactions was just one of the statute’s attempted reforms. Additionally, a statute providing more
extensive mandates for managing groundwater-surface water interactions might not have survived the
legislative process, because strong interests had
evolved in reliance on the old distinctions [16]. Legislating involves compromise and political constraints,
and those inherent limitations will complicate any
effort to integrate scientiﬁc understanding into statutory law.
4.3.1. Interfaces with written law
As discussed above, SGMA creates new statutory
mandates, and it also has generated new implementing
regulations. That means it has addressed, albeit not
completely, items 2 and 4 from ﬁgure 1. But our
workshops and research revealed that items 1 and 3—
changing underlying legal principles and addressing
intersections with other statutes—remain signiﬁcant
challenges.
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4.3.1.1. Revising underlying legal principles
In any legal regime, speciﬁc statutory terms are likely
both to be grounded in and to interact with a set of
basic legal principles, which may ﬂow from constitutional authority or from traditional common law. That
is true in California, where water law builds from
several basic principles—some of which conﬂict.
Bringing together groundwater and surface water law
will require resolving some of these conﬂicts, yet
SGMA leaves that task largely unaddressed.
Some of these basic legal principles come from the
underlying property rights regime. As discussed
above, California law recognizes multiple types of
water usage rights, and some of those rights are grounded in temporal priority while others are grounded in
geographic proximity (table 2). Reconciling groundwater and surface water management will sometimes
require reconciling those competing principles. For
example, overlying groundwater users and appropriative surface water users will sometimes claim the
same water—particularly as climate change and regulatory limitations lead to increased scarcity and
competition.
Complicating these potential conﬂicts is another
underlying principle. Because groundwater and surface water rights are property rights, both are protected by state and federal constitutional prohibitions
of ‘taking’ property without just compensation [36].
Consequently, when regulators attempt to reconcile
competing groundwater and surface water right
claims, or when they attempt to reconcile either type
of claim with environmental protections, some water
users may argue that their property has been
taken [36].
SGMA does not address these potential conﬂicts. It
expressly disclaims altering surface water or groundwater rights [50]. It also states that GSPs are not
obliged to address undesirable results—including surface water impacts—that occurred prior to 1, January
2015 [51]. In combination, this language gives surface
water users no new basis for challenging pre-2015
pumping, unless effects occur after SGMA’s effective
date. But the language does not eliminate the possibility of challenges under other legal theories, or of takings claims. Consequently, SGMA remains agnostic
on the resolution of old conﬂicts between groundwater and surface water users, and legal uncertainty
remains.
SGMA also leaves residual legal uncertainty about
two other underlying principles of California water
law. California’s public trust doctrine establishes the
general principle that navigable waterways should be
managed, where feasible, to serve public values like
environmental protection [52]. California’s reasonable use doctrine provides additional authority for
environmental protection [53, 54]. There are strong
arguments that these laws apply to groundwater uses
that deplete surface waterways [55], but SGMA says
nothing explicit about the interrelationships between
7

groundwater regulation and the public trust doctrine
or reasonable use doctrine. Consequently, the exact
nature of the resulting legal requirements awaits clariﬁcation through additional administrative action, legislation, or the courts.
4.3.1.2. Addressing intersections with other statutes
Any new statutory reform is likely to affect other preexisting laws. Continuing questions about water
rights, takings doctrine, reasonable use, and the public
trust doctrine exemplify this type of challenge. Our
workshops and research also identiﬁed another major
set of challenges deriving from other legal regimes.
Federal and state laws including the ESA and the Clean
Water Act protect aquatic ecosystems and water
quality [56]. But the intersections between these laws
and groundwater use and management remain
unsettled even after SGMA’s passage.
The ESA, which has been centrally important to
California surface water management, exempliﬁes this
uncertainty [13]. It prohibits actions that ‘take’ endangered and some threatened species, and takes can
occur through habitat modiﬁcations that ‘harm’ species [57, 58]. Scientists understand that groundwater
can be important to many threatened and endangered
species [59]. The possibility of prohibited takes therefore seems obvious. But even if scientists (and lawmakers) understand that groundwater and surface
water are generally interconnected, the diffuse nature
of the impact means that they may not be able to link
particular groundwater users’ activities to particular
environmental effects in surface waterways [60]. The
resulting uncertainty is not unique to the ESA. Wherever laws require showing some causal connection
between regulated actions and environmental harms,
the scientiﬁc uncertainties surrounding groundwater
management are likely to create legal risk.
SGMA says little about managing these intersections. By requiring sustainable groundwater management and by prohibiting new signiﬁcant and
unreasonable impacts to surface waterways and surface water users, SGMA advances environmental protection. But it establishes neither speciﬁc standards
nor tailored procedures for integrating groundwater
into the larger web of statutory environmental law.
4.3.2. Interfaces with institutions and practices
Even if the doctrinal quandaries described above were
resolved, integrating groundwater and surface water
management would still raise major institutional and
procedural challenges. While SGMA takes steps
toward addressing these challenges—to use ﬁgure 1’s
framework, it creates new agencies (5) and new
decision-making venues and procedures (6) and is
beginning to forge new networks (7) and facilitate
institutional learning (8)—signiﬁcant challenges
remain.
As mentioned above, management institutions for
groundwater and surface water have evolved in
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Table 3. Pre-SGMA assignment of responsibility for activities related to groundwater-surface water interactions.
Local
agencies

Responsibility (Pre-SGMA)
Groundwater rights
and regulation
Surface water rights
and regulation
Environmental laws

Regulating groundwater use

State
agencies

Federal
agencies

X

Allocating and regulating
surface water rights
Supplying surface water
Implementing the public
trust doctrine
Implementing statutory
environmental laws

Common law and the courts
X

X

disparate ways. In California, groundwater regulation
and management have been championed as local prerogatives, while surface water regulation is handled
primarily by the SWRCB (table 3). Similarly, while a
state agency—DWR—is one of California’s largest
surface water suppliers, no state agency supplies
groundwater.
These traditional responsibilities have consequences for managerial networks and experience.
For surface water, signiﬁcant interactions of the
SWRCB and DWR with wildlife agencies are common.
For groundwater, analogous interactions have been
relatively rare. SGMA changes this status quo by giving
the state explicit oversight and intervention authority
over local groundwater management and by expanding the responsibilities of local managers. Nevertheless, the old institutional arrangements have legacy
effects that will complicate implementation of the
new. Indeed, much of the discussion in our workshops
focused on the challenges and opportunities created
by the shifting institutional landscape.
One key legacy effect involves the distribution of
expertize. Because no state agency previously asserted
authority to manage or regulate groundwater-surface
water interactions, there is no state entity with experience doing so. Instead, DWR and the SWRCB will
need to develop expertize and translate technical
knowledge into effective oversight and intervention
programs. For local governments, the challenges could
be even greater. Many GSAs are forming in areas
where local governments have never regulated water
use (beyond straightforward well permitting). And
local governments often face challenges funding
governance of any kind [61]. Consequently, the institutional capacity necessary for managing groundwater-surface water interactions must be built from
the ground up at multiple levels, sometimes under
severe funding and resource constraints [62].
A related challenge is the lack of established
human networks and relationships. Effective regulation typically requires discretion, communication,
diplomacy, negotiation, trust, and improvisation [63].
Effective regulators often rely on relationships with
other agencies, advocacy groups, and regulated entities to navigate technical and resource challenges. In
8

Other

X
X

X

X

X

Pre-1914 and riparian rights allocated by common law
Private water suppliers

an established arena like surface water management,
those networks are often well-developed. When
groundwater-surface water challenges arise, however,
both regulators and those they regulate may not know
where to begin or whom to contact. And while key
SGMA deadlines require quick action, processes for
responding to these challenges are still under
development.
4.4. Remaining gaps
In summary, reconciling California law with the reality
of groundwater-surface water interconnection is a
complex, multifaceted process, and removing the
legacies of traditional legal divides will require intervention at many levels of law- and policy-making.
Table 4 illustrates this complexity, comparing SGMA’s
reforms and the remaining gaps and challenges to the
conceptual framework introduced in Part 3.

5. Drawing broader lessons from SGMA
California water law and management are distinctive,
and the speciﬁc challenges would differ for other
attempts to address gaps between law and science.
Another reform statute might be clear on underlying
principles but vague on speciﬁc substantive mandates.
Or the substantive mandates might be clear while
decision-making processes and agency responsibilities
are left undeﬁned. The only near-universal gap is likely
to be the challenge of creating institutional memory.
Nevertheless, the presence of legacy effects and the
need for a multilayered response are likely to arise
anywhere policymakers seek to reconcile law with
science. The basic evaluative framework presented
here can help scholars understand what has been
accomplished and where major work remains, and
help policymakers plot courses forward.
The framework also has utility for researchers
seeking to understand environmental science-policylaw interfaces. By integrating the notion of a multifaceted set of science-policy interfaces into discussions
of science, policy, and law, it can help scholars and
practitioners think beyond a myopic focus on legislative change as they work to reconcile law with science.
For researchers who are concerned with the
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Table 4. SGMA’s role in reforming regulation and management of groundwater-surface water interconnections.
Potential elements of reform
Written law

Institutions and
practices

SGMA’s role

Remaining gaps

1. Changing/creating
fundamental principles

– Acknowledges the interconnection
of groundwater and surface water
systems and management

– SGMA does not change/integrate the
groundwater and surface water rights
systems

2. Changing/creating speciﬁc
statutory mandates

– Requires groundwater managers to
avoid depletions of surface water that
have ‘signiﬁcant and unreasonable’
impacts on surface water users, where
those impacts occur after 1,
January 2015

– SGMA leaves conﬂicts arising from
past impacts to be resolved under
other laws
– SGMA does not require surface water
managers to avoid signiﬁcant and
unreasonable impacts to groundwater users

3. Addressing interactions
with intersecting legal
regimes

– Acknowledges water rights law,
exempts GSPs from state environmental review, and requires consistency with local land-use planning
by cities and counties

– SGMA is largely silent with respect
the public trust doctrine, takings doctrine, and statutory environmental
laws and does not fully address water
rights law

4. Changing/creating
regulations and guidance

– Assigns DWR responsibility for creating implementing regulations and
guidance

– SGMA, its implementing regulations,
and related guidance documents do
not address the gaps identiﬁed above
and below

5. Changing/creating implementing agencies

– Mandates the creation of GSAs
– Assigns new groundwater management oversight responsibilities to the
SWRCB, DWR

– SGMA does not address the groundwater management responsibilities of
other local, state, or federal agencies

6. Changing/creating
decision-making venues
and processes

– Makes GSPs and DWR and SWRCB
processes the venues for key decisions

– SGMA allows but does not compel
surface water managers, land-use regulators, and federal resource agencies
to participate in GSP creation and
implementation.

7. Building communication
networks and human
infrastructure

– Authorizes DWR to support local
capacity-building

– Creates GSP development as a key
planning process

– Compels some communication
between GSAs, DWR, and the
SWRCB
– Compels some communication
among nearby GSAs

– SGMA does not compel communication between GSAs or state agencies
and surface water managers or federal
resource agencies.

– Compels some communication
between GSAs and local land-use
authorities (cities and counties)
8. Adjusting ongoing,
discretionary practices of
resource managers

– Creates new responsibilities, which
will spur learning.

effectiveness of science-policy communication systems, differentiating among interfaces will matter,
because communication systems that work for one
decision-making body, such as a legislature, may not
work for others such as agencies or courts. For
researchers focused on the appropriate degree of
engagement between scientists and political sphere
[33], the different interfaces again matter, because
some policymaking entities are more political than
others. And for researchers focused on adaptive management, the differentiation again matters, because
some forms of policymaking will be more adaptive
than others. In short, while engaging with the
9

– SGMA does not (and could not)
instantly create institutional memory
for managing groundwater-surface
water interactions

complexity of law- and policy-making realms will
complicate analyses of science-policy interfaces, it also
can make those analyses richer and more valuable.

6. Conclusion
For California water management, SGMA’s acknowledgment of groundwater-surface water interconnections is like the Berlin Wall coming down. After over a
century, the most important and frequently-criticized
boundary in California water law is crumbling. But
just as the Berlin Wall’s fall set in motion a long and
difﬁcult integration process, California too will need
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years to reconcile legal and management systems that
spent decades in artiﬁcial separation.
This article has emphasized the challenges facing
legal and management systems that attempt to move
past such artiﬁcial legal distinctions. Using the case of
water management in California, we have demonstrated that many levels of reform will be necessary for
overcoming the challenges arising from gaps between
scientiﬁc knowledge and policy, and we have created a
framework for assessing which of those levels a particular reform effort addresses and where the greatest
continuing challenges remain. While the gaps faced by
other reform efforts will be different, identifying them
will be central to the process of moving past the legacy
effects of legal ﬁctions and towards policy that better
reﬂects scientiﬁc reality.
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